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I. INTRODUCTION
The West Virginia Code disqualifies an employee from receiving
unemployment compensation benefits (UCB) if the employee is in-
volved in a work stoppage resulting from a labor dispute.' However,
no disqualification is imposed if: (1) an employee is required to accept
wages, hours, or conditions of employment substantially less favorable
than those prevailing for similar work in the same locality; (2) an
employee is denied the right of collective bargaining by the employer;
or (3) the employer shuts down the operation or dismisses the employ-
ee to force wage reductions, changes in hours, or working conditions.2
The code section is vaguely worded and permits considerable
judicial interpretation of the labor dispute disqualification (LDD) and
its purpose and justification. In part II of my paper, I will discuss the
major West Virginia cases that have addressed the LDD. This discus-
sion will culminate with a discussion of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals' recent decision in Roberts v. Gatson.3
In part III, I will discuss scholarly commentary about the LDD
and look at some important decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. I hope to show in these first two parts that the LDD
results in inconsistent decisions, is difficult to administer, undermines
the federal labor policy in favor of collective bargaining, and cannot
be reconciled with the goals of the Unemployment Compensation Act
(Act).
1. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
2. Id.
3. 392 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1990).
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In part Il, I propose that West Virginia radically reform the LDD
by adopting New York's unique approach to work stoppages and the
receipt of UCB. The New York Act requires strikers to wait seven
weeks before becoming eligible for UCB.4 New York's approach is
more consistent with the public policy favoring collective bargaining,
accomplishes state neutrality in labor disputes, and is easier to admin-
ister.
H. WEST VIRGINIA CASES
A. Early Attempts To Interpret The Act
One of the first important West Virginia cases to address the LDD
was Miners in General Group v. Hix.5 Miners discussed the basic
issues of what a labor dispute is for purposes of the Act, the purposes
of UCB, and the definition of involuntary employment.'
Miners concerned the claims of thousands of coal miners involved
in a strike from April 1 to May 13, 1939, when a new contract was
signed. The prior collective bargaining agreement expired on March
31, 1939.7 The mine owners sought to have the miners accept a wage
reduction.8 Two weeks before the strike the miners offered to continue
to work after the contract expired until a new one could be made,
such work to be performed at the wages specified by the old con-
tract. 9 The mine owners rejected this offer."0
The miners contended that they were eligible for UCB because
there was no labor dispute within the meaning of the Act. They argued
that a labor dispute is a dispute that occurs involving an existing con-
tract. Because no contract was in place at the time of the work stop-
page, there was no labor dispute."
4. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 592(1) (McKinney 1988).
5. 17 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1941).
6. IR. at 815.
7. Id. at 812-13.
8. Id. at 813.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 816.
19931 793
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The court refused to accept the miners' argument that labor dis-
putes are disputes over existing contracts. 2 The court concluded that
a labor dispute can indeed exist without a contract being currently in
place.13 In reaching its decision, however, the court found it neces-
sary to inquire into the merits of the parties' positions. 4 The court
found that there would have been no work stoppage if the miners had
accepted the mine operators' offer to renew the terms of the 1937 con-
tract or if the operators had agreed to a closed shop.'5 The court
quoted approvingly a Kentucky Supreme Court decision that UCB are
not available "to enable those who are offered continuation of employ-
ment to refrain from work." 6 Hence, even though the court acknowl-
edged that either side could have prevented the work stoppage, only
the miners were penalized because of the labor dispute. The court
focused entirely on the miners' "fault" while ignoring the operators'
fault: "Here the workers were voluntarily idle because they followed
their organization in an attempt to better their conditions."'17 By
"seeking additional advantages," the miners forfeited their rights to
UCB.' 8 That the operators were also seeking "advantages" had no
bearing on the outcome.
12. This argument enjoyed some support at the time of this decision as evidenced by
a proposed amendment to permit UCB to strikers unemployed due to the expiration of a
contract. The amendment would have allowed strikers to receive benefits until a new con-
tract was negotiated. See id at 820.
13. Id at 816.
14. The court indicated that it primarily wanted to know why the proposed contract
was not entered into so as to avert a strike. This is the same as inquiring into which party
is. at fault by looking at the merits of the parties' objectives and proposals. Hence, Miners
illustrates a fundamental weakness of the LDD. It requires courts to involve themselves in
assessing the merits of a dispute. Such an assessment necessarily will conflict with the
doctrine of state neutrality used to justify the LDD in many decisions. For a key case that
discusses the state neutrality doctrine, see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union,
361 U.S. 477 (1959).
15. Miners, 17 S.E.2d at 816.
16. Id at 819 (quoting Barnes v. Hall, 146 S.W.2d 929 (Ky. 1940)).
17. Id at 820. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the voluntariness rationale in Ohio
Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977). Nonetheless, courts continue
to rely on the voluntariness rationale despite Hodory. See, e.g., Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge,
291 S.E.2d 477, 482 (W. Va. 1982) (Act is designed to protect workers who are involun-
tarily unemployed). For a federal case reaching the same conclusion, see United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Johnson, 830 F.2d 924, 928 (8th Cir. 1987).
18. Ia
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Miners is important because it clarified the meaning of "labor
dispute," and, in so doing, rejected the argument that a dispute must
be over an existing contract. Miners illustrates one of the shortcomings
of the LDD provision: employees can be penalized for seeking their
own advantages while employers are not penalized despite engaging in
the same behavior. 9 Miners also relied on a common justification of
the LDD: that strikers are voluntarily unemployed.2" This use of the
word "voluntary" ignores the possibility that a labor dispute could well
be more the result of an employer's intransigence or anti-union animus
than it is the result of voluntary behavior by employees. The LDD, as
Miners illustrates, permits obstinacy and hard bargaining by employers
while imposing a costly penalty on employees. Furthermore, attempting
to decide who is at fault in a labor dispute involves time-consuming,
complex factual inquiries. Determining fault will also inevitably lead to
inconsistent results. Both parties in the dispute are seeking gain, but
when employees seek to gain by resorting to a strike, their self-seeking
is "fault" while the employers' self-seeking is not. Miners illustrates
that the "voluntariness" of strikers' unemployment cannot provide a
sufficient justification for the LDD.2" The problem of a lack of a rea-
sonable basis to justify the LDD will reappear in all of the cases dis-
cussed in this Article.
Finally, Miners attempted to reconcile the purposes of unemploy-
ment compensation with the existence of the LDD. This has proven to
be difficult, primarily because the stated goals of the Act are not con-
sistent with the LDD.22 The court found that the purpose of the Act
19. Even though the court stated that employees should not be penalized for "asserting
their right to more satisfactory terms," it is clear nonetheless that the strikers are being
denied UCB precisely for the behavior which the court says should not be penalized. See
id' at 821.
20. Id at 820.
21. See, e.g., Leonard Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55
YALE L.J. 167, 171 (1946) (explaining why "voluntariness" as an argument to support the
LDD is flawed).
22. See W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1 (1989) (purposes of unemployment compensation are
to "[p]rovide a measure of security to the families of unemployed persons"; to "[gluard
against menaces to health, morals, and welfare arising from unemployment"; to "sustain the
economy in times of economic depression"; to "[s]timulate stability of employment as a req-
uisite of social and economic security"; and to "[a]llay and prevent the debilitating conse-
1993]
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was to assist those who cannot find work, not to assist those who
reject an offer of continuing employment to try to better their posi-
tions.23 Nonetheless, there is a clear conflict between the LDD and
the Act's stated purposes. Furthermore, as Judge Lovins stated in his
dissent, the Act is a remedial piece of legislation and should be con-
strued liberally.24 If the LDD had been construed consistent with the
stated purposes of the Act, the miners' interpretation of what makes a
labor dispute would have been accepted.' None of the stated purpos-
es of the Act are furthered by a strict construction and application of
the LDD.
The next major case to address the LDD was Homer Laughlin
China Co. v. Hix.26 This case addressed such key questions as: What
is a "work stoppage"? What are "conditions of employment substantial-
ly less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in the locali-
ty"?27 What is "voluntarily leaving work without good cause involv-
ing fault on the part of the employer"?
28
Homer Laughlin involved a wildcat strike that occurred between
August 2 and August 17, 1943.29 Three employees, the claimants in
Homer Laughlin, were the leaders of the strike. The employer refused
to let them return to work unless they agreed to return as new em-
ployees without seniority.3° The court first addressed the question of
whether a work stoppage had occurred. It had no trouble deciding that
a seventy-five to eighty percent curtailment of production in one of the
employer's departments constituted a work stoppage.31 The Act does
quences of poor relief assistance"). That the Act's policies and the LDD conflict is not sur-
prising. Almost all of the states hastily adopted the Social Security Board's Model Draft
Bill for UCB without considering carefully the meaning of the legislation they were passing.
See ROBERT HUTCHENS ET AL., STRIKERS AND SUBSIDIES: THE INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS ON STRIKE AcTIVITY 18-19 (1989).
23. Miners, 17 S.E.2d at 820.
24. Id. at 821 (Lovins, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. 37 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1947).
27. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
28. I
29. Homer Laughlin, 37 S.E.2d at 651.
30. Id. at 653.
31. Id. at 650, syl. pt. 1.
[Vol. 95:791796
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not define work stoppage, and it is not clear how the court concluded
that a seventy-five percent reduction is sufficient. One could argue
that, because striking employees involved in a work stoppage suffer a
one hundred percent reduction of UCB, the employer's diminution of
production should also be nearly one hundred percent. Nothing in the
Act implies that a work stoppage should be anything less than a total
stoppage for the LDD to apply. Also, the court found a work stoppage
had occurred at one of the employer's departments but did not consid-
er the effect on the employer's entire operation.
The work stoppage issue appears in other West Virginia cases. It
requires complex factual determinations that must be made without any
statutory guidelines. Not only can this result in prolonged legal battles,
it can result in arbitrary decisions. Difficult issues must be (or ought
to be) addressed, such as: How does one measure the percentage of
diminution in production needed for a work stoppage? If the parties'
evidence conflict, how can conflicts be resolved? Should the level of
continued delivery of goods and services be considered along with
figures concerning production? How can production be measured in
operations that deliver services rather than make products? Should
different standards apply to conglomerates? If, at some point in the
strike, the strikers offer to return to work but the employer does not
permit them, is there still a work stoppage for UCB purposes? Should
the Employment Security Administration make the sometimes difficult
determination whether a strike or a lockout has occurred or should it
await a decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) if this
issue is before that body? Does the Employment Security Administra-
tion have the same expertise as the NLRB has so that it could make
consistent findings whether a strike or a lockout has occurred? What is
the effect of contracting out struck work? These variables can lead to
inconsistent results.32 Indeed, in some non-West Virginia cases, de-
32. Only Missouri has tried to codify a definition of work stoppage. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 288.040(6)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1992). It requires the diminution of activities, production, or
services to be "substantial." Obviously, this definition does not reduce the difficulties in-
volved in determining how much work stoppage must occur to be substantial. "Substantial"
could fairly be interpreted as anything from ten percent to ninety percent. See Marc
Schoenfield, Public Benefits and The Labor Dispute Disqualification from State Unemploy-
ment Compensation and Federal Food Stamp Eligibility, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 863, 873
19931 797
7
Matheny: Labor Dispute Disqualification for Unemployment Compensation Bene
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
creases in production of only twenty to thirty percent have been held
to be sufficient for a work stoppage to occur.33 Finding only thirty
percent reductions to be work stoppages results in harsh treatment of
strikers by totally disqualifying them from receiving UCB, while the
employer continues to operate at seventy percent of the prior operating
level. Such unequal treatment of strikers and their employers conflicts
with the "state neutrality in labor disputes" justification 6ften relied on
to justify the LDD.M I will discuss state neutrality in greater detail
throughout this Article.
The court also addressed the question of what constitutes "condi-
tions of employment substantially less favorable than those prevailing
for similar work in the same locality."35 If an employer requires an
employee to accept such terms to end the dispute, then the employee
can receive UCB. By trying to force the claimants to give up their
seniority rights, the employer in Homer Laughlin attempted to force
them to accept substantially "less favorable" conditions of employment,
according to the court.3 6
The main reason that the claimants prevailed in Homer Laughlin
is that the employer did not simply fire the three claimants. Because
the strike was unauthorized, the employer had the right to terminate
the claimants' employment. If the claimants had been fired, the em-
ployment relationship would no longer exist, and the claimants would
no longer have been employees who were being forced to accept sub-
stantially less favorable conditions.37 Therefore, if the claimants had
been fired and still wanted their old jobs back, the employer could
have rehired them as new employees without seniority rights.
(1988).
33. Jerre S. Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualification-A Primer and Some Prob-
lems, 8 VAND. L. REV. 338, 340 (1955).
34. As one commentator observed, because the employer usually has more resources to
survive a labor dispute than employees do, a truly neutral state would pay UCB to employ-
ees involved in a dispute to make the conflict more equal. Penalizing the weaker party by
denying benefits is not neutrality. Milton I. Shadhur, Unemployment Benefits and the 'Labor
Dispute" Disqualification, 17 U. Cn. L. REV. 294, 298 (1950).
35. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
36. Homer Laughlin, 37 S.E.2d at 655.
37. Id.
[Vol. 95:791
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Hence, the court made two conclusions about the employment
relationship between strikers and employers. One was that an employer
may terminate without penalty its relationship to an employee who is
involved in a wildcat strike .3 The other was that such terminations
are not "self-executing." The employer must act to terminate the em-
ployment relationship. Termination cannot simply be inferred.39
In reaching its decision, the court relied on what it considered to
be the main purpose of the Act: "To provide reasonable and effective
means for the protection of social and economic security by reducing
as far as practicable the hazards of unemployment." 4 If this is the
main purpose of the Act, it is not clear how the LDD promotes it.
The employer can adequately protect its interests by discharging wild-
cat strikers. However, subjecting the strikers and their families to an
indefinite period of no or little income works against the purpose of
the Act. The Act's purpose is to protect workers from .the hazards of
unemployment, not to be another economic weapon in the employer's
arsenal. Furthermore, one should note that UCB will not be denied to
an unemployed person who refuses to accept a position which is avail-
able because of a labor dispute.41 It is an odd policy that makes such
drastic distinctions between strikers and those who support the strike
by refusing to accept a position made available by the strike.4 2 Many
such inconsistencies are created by the LDD because the LDD is in-
consistent with the Act itself. I will return to this point later.
Copen v. Hix4 3 addresses a provision in the Act that disqualifies
a person who is "participating, financing, or directly interested" in a
labor dispute.' Copen concerned employees who did not belong to
the "grade" or "class" of workers who were participating in, financing,
38. IM
39, Id.
40. IM at 655-56.
41. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-6 (1989).
42. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(1) (1989) specifically states that concern for the welfare
of the families of unemployed persons is one purpose of the Act. It is difficult to see how
the purpose is in any way advanced by singling out the families of strikers for special
treatment.
43. 43 S.E.2d 382 (W. Va. 1947).
44. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
19931 799
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or directly interested in the dispute. The strikers in Copen were mem-
bers of a foremen's union, which was affiliated with the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA).4 5 The claimants were also members
of the UMWA, but they were all nonsupervisory workers who had no
legal relationship with, nor influence over, the striking foremen. 6
Nonetheless, the court found that the common membership of the
claimants and the foremen in the UMWA was sufficient to disqualify
the claimants because they participated in, financed, and were directly
interested in. the dispute.47 Hence, although the claimants had no dis-
pute with the employer and even had reported to work but were told
to go home, they still fell under the LDD.
In 1986, the court in Ash v. Rutledge48 did not explicitly overrule
Copen, but it mentioned the dissenting opinion with approval. This
suggests that Copen is no longer good law. Still, however, Copen
serves as a useful illustration of the possibilities for injustice that are
inherent in the Act. Courts have few reliable guidelines to help them
to interpret the meanings of terms like "participating," "financing," and
"directly interested." Copen disposed of approximately two hundred
claims for UCB 9 The LDD's vagueness unjustly imposed economic
hardship on approximately two hundred miners and their families. The
-dissent, penned by Justice Riley, stated that broadly defining the terms
in the LDD, such as the Copen majority did, conflicts with all five of
the Act's stated purposes.50 Copen's failure to reconcile the purpose
of the Act with a broad interpretation of the LDD suggests that there
is no rational basis to harmonize the LDD with the purposes of the Act."
45. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 385. For a recent case involving the LDD and supervisory
employees, see Laursen v. Kiewit Constr. Co., 390 N.W.2d 534 (Neb. 1986) (holding that
LDD applied to a supervisor laid off because of lack of work caused by a strike involving
only non-supervisory employees). Such a holding blatantly contradicts with federal labor law
policy because supervisory employees are excluded from the definition of employee under
the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988).
46. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 386.
47. It
48. 348 S.E.2d 442, 446 (W. Va. 1986).
49. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 383.
50. Id. at 387 (Riley, J., dissenting).
51. gee, e.g., Lesser, supra note 21, at 171 (discussing the difficulties finding a con-
vincing policy to justify the LDD). Almost all states have case law that emphasizes the
[Vol. 95:791
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This doctrinal confusion continued in State v. Ruthbell Coal
Co.,52 where the claimants refused to cross a picket line set up by
the UMWA. There was no dispute between the claimants and the coal
company. The claimants were paid UCB because, unlike the claimants
in Copen, they were not members of the UMWA.53 The employer
complained that the UCB paid to the claimants should not be charged
to its account because the claimants voluntarily refused to work with-
out fault on the employer's part. The court held that the UCB
should not be charged to the employer. However, the court also found
that the claimants had good cause to cease working because crossing
the picket line could be dangerous.55
If Ruthbell Coal and Copen are compared, difficulties arise. For
example, the court found that the claimants in Ruthbell Coal had good
cause to leave work, but the claimants in Copen did not. In Copen,
the claimants reported to work but were told to go home because there
was no work due to the foremen's strike. In Ruthbell Coal, the claim-
ants refused to cross a picket line. What distinguishes Copen's claim-
ants from Ruthbell Coal's is not clear. Despite the common UMWA
membership, the claimants in Copen appeared for work. Yet the court
did not find good cause for the claimant's failure to work in Copen
despite the evidence that the claimants were not voluntarily unem-
ployed. If fault has anything to do with the LDD, it is not clear how
it operates when one compares Copen and Ruthbell Coal. In Ruthbell
Coal, the court found that the refusal to work did not further the labor
dispute. However, it seems clear that joining strikers in a work stop-
page is a form of participating in the dispute. There was no allegation
that the claimants in Ruthbell Coal would have been in any danger
had they crossed the picket line.56 If danger can be assumed when a
person attempts to work at a business involved in a labor dispute, then
the assumption would apply as much to Copen's claimants as to
narrow construction to be accorded to the LDD. For such a case in West Virginia, see
Gordon v. Rutledge, 337 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1985).
52. 56 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1949).
53. Id at 558.
54. Id at 559.
55. Id at 558.
56. Id
1993]
11
Matheny: Labor Dispute Disqualification for Unemployment Compensation Bene
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1993
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [
Ruthbell Coal's claimants. Finally, the employer in Ruthbell Coal kept
its mine fully operational in case the claimants should decide to return
to work, while the Copen claimants were told that work had
stopped.5 7
The main reason that the claimants in Ruthbell Coal received
UCB while those in Copen were disqualified is that the Copen claim-
ants belonged to the same union as the strikers. Hence, these claimants
were of the same "grade" or "class" as the striking foremen. 8 In
Ruthbell Coal, the claimants did not belong to the same union and
were not, therefore, members of the same "grade" or "class" as the
strikers. 59 No doubt there is a difference between the two groups of
claimants, but the difference is not important enough to justify award-
ing UCB to one group of claimants and not the other. Both groups of
claimants faced essentially the same predicament: they were unem-
ployed due to strikes over which they had no control.
Another problem illustrated by Ruthbell Coal is the vagueness of
the word "voluntary" when it is used to justify a decision involving
the LDD. Many cases -point to the voluntariness of a striker's unem-
ployment to justify the LDD in West Virginia and other states.' De-
ciding which strikes are the result of the workers' free will and which
strikes are the result of employer intransigence requires an improbably
high degree of understanding of the facts surrounding the dispute and
the motives of the parties.6' Furthermore, as Ruthbell Coal reveals,
some work stoppages might be voluntary, yet good cause exists. Deter-
mining if good cause exists also will require extensive inquiries into
the motives of the parties and the facts surrounding the dispute. Not
only is maling the determination of voluntariness difficult, but deter-
mining whether good cause exists further complicates an already com-
plicated investigation. Ironically, however, even if the court makes the
57. Id
58. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 386.
59. Ruthbell Coal, 56 S.E.2d at 558.
60. Schoenfield, supra note 32, at 866 (the voluntariness of strikers' unemployment is
a leading rationale for the LDD).
61. See also Lesser, supra note 21, at 171 (for a test of voluntariness to be fair it
would have to consider the economic and psychological pressures surrounding the dispute).
Vol. 95:791
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difficult decision that a strike is voluntary, voluntariness fails to justify
the LDD. This is because there is an inherent conflict between the
LDD and the stated purposes of the Act.62 The Act does not disquali-
fy one for voluntarily quitting. It disqualifies one for voluntarily quit-
ting without good cause. Voluntariness alone does not justify the LDD.
For example, a worker who is discharged for voluntary misconduct can
receive UCB after a six-week disqualification period.63 If even volun-
tary misconduct does not result in indefinite disqualification, what
policy justifies disqualifying strikers for the duration of the work stop-
page when they are engaged in legal activity? Unless one is willing to
believe that no striker ever has good cause for stopping work, it is
difficult to discern what purpose of the Act is furthered by allowing
workers who have voluntarily quit to have the opportunity to prove
good cause while denying strikers the same opportunity."
Copen and Ruthbell Coal do nothing to explain how voluntariness
is determined or why it is a sufficient rationale for the LDD. One of
the main questions presented in Copen was whether the claimants left
work voluntarily and whether there existed "good cause not involving
fault on the part of the employer."65 The court found that work was
available to the claimants if they had chosen to do it.66 Hence, the
court implied that the claimants were voluntarily unemployed even
though they were told by their foremen to go home because there was
62. Schoenfield, supra note 32, at 866 (several difficulties are inherent in any attempt
to harmonize the LDD with the stated purposes of the UCB Acts).
63. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(2) (Supp. 1992).
64. The problem of the lack of a persuasive rationale for the LDD strongly suggests
that the LDD's main purpose is to punish strikers for engaging in concerted activity. Sever-
al commentators have discussed the inconsistency involved in not permitting striking employ-
ees to attempt to show good cause for strike activity. See e.g., Lesser, supra note 21, at
171; Robert Hutchens et al., Government Transfer Payments and Strike Activity: Reforming
Public Policy, 1990 LAB. LJ. 505, 511. West Virginia, however, does allow an attempt to
show good cause in connection with the LDD. Ash v. Rutledge, 348 S.E.2d 442, 444 (W.
Va. 1986) (applying good cause standard in W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(1) (Supp. 1992) to
LDD). Despite this liberal interpretation, the practical effect of Ash is diminished by vague
standards and lack of guidance regarding "good cause." See Ash, 348 S.E.2d at 447
(Brotherton, J. & Neely, J., dissenting).
65. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 387.
66. Id
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no work.67 Surprisingly, the court proceeded to state that it is not "a
matter of particular consequence" if the claimants voluntarily stopped
working.6 The court said if the claimants had "reported for duty bo-
na fide and were really seeking work," such actions might have shown
they were not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the
dispute." The court concluded, without explaining how, that the
claimants were not "really seeking work" and voluntarily participated
in the foremen's dispute with the company.7 °
In Ruthbell Coal the court gave no more analysis of what
voluntariness is than it did in Copen. The court asked, "But did
defendant's employees leave work 'voluntarily for good cause'? We
think they did."'71 The voluntariness rationale raises many problems.
The Copen court noted that the claimants might have exposed them-
selves to danger if they had tried to cross the picket line.72 Nonethe-
less, the court found their work stoppage to be voluntary.73 In a real
sense, the refusal to cross the picket line was voluntary, a conscious
decision not to expose one's self to danger. On the other hand, the
decision is involuntary because the claimants were prevented from
going to work. Certainly, the decision not to work was not an unfet-
tered exercise of free will. 4 The court perceived no contradiction in
stating that the claimants were voluntarily unemployed but also unem-
ployed because of "the threatened risk" from the strike. 5 Clearly, the
main reason that the claimants did not cross the picket line was fear.
A decision partly caused by fear is not completely voluntary.
67. Id at 386.
68. Id at 387 (in the preceding paragraph voluntariness was the "question presented"
but now is described as of no consequence).
69. L
70. Id (the court concludes suddenly: "So without going into a great deal of detail
we wish to say that in our opinion there was available work" for the claimants).
71. Ruthbell Coal, 56 S.E.2d at 558.
72. L
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id For discussion of the complexity and contradictions involved in deciding
whether refusal to cross a picket line is voluntary, see Thomas Gross, A Possible Cure For
a Case of Mistaken Identity: Non-Striking Workers Who Have Failed to Cross a Picket
Line, 42 U. PITr. L. REV. 87 (1980).
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B. The Attempt in Davis v. Hix To Clarify the Meaning of
Participating, Financing, or Being Directly Interested in a
Labor Dispute
In Davis v. Hix,76 the court attempted to clarify its decision in
Copen that a claimant who has no labor dispute with the employer but
belongs to the same national union as the strikers disqualifies the
claimant because she or he is participating in, financing, or directly
interested in the dispute.77
As in Copen, the claimants in Davis belonged to the UMWA. The
main difference in Davis was that the claimants had all been separated
from employment prior to the strike.78 The Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review (Board) disqualified the claimants for "participat-
ing in" a labor dispute. 9 The Board based its decision on testimony
from the claimants that if they had been offered "new work" in the
mines, they would have refused to have worked during the strike.80
Hence, the Board concluded that the claimants were not available for
full-time work.81 They were, by refusing the work, participating in
the dispute.82 The Board correctly noted that ordinarily a claimant
cannot be disqualified for refusal to accept a position created by a
labor dispute.8 3 However, it found that this exception was not applica-
ble in this case because the refused work was the claimants' "usual
and customary work" in the mines." The court found that the
Board's holding was so broad that it would result in denying to all
unemployed miners the right to rely on the exception in section 21A-
6-6(1) of the West Virginia Code.85
76. 84 S.E.2d 404 (W. Va. 1950).
77. Copen v. Hix, 43 S.E.2d 382, 386 (W. Va. 1947).
78. Davis, 84 S.E.2d at 406-07 syl. pt. 11.
79. Id. at 409.
80. IC
81. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-1(3) (1989).
82. Davis, 84 S.E.2d at 409.
83. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-6(1) (1989).
84. Davis, 84 S.E.2d at 412.
85. 1d
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The court refused to find membership in the UMWA sufficient to
implicate the LDD in a case where the struck employer and the claim-
ants have no employer-employee relationship. 6 The court distin-
guished Copen by pointing out that those claimants still had an em-
ployment relationship with the employer. Therefore, their membership
in the UMWA was sufficient to disqualify them.
The odd conclusion that results from reading Copen and Davis
together is that it is better to quit or be fired before a labor dispute
occurs than it is still to be an employee. The liberal intent of the Act
makes it difficult to justify the technical distinctions regarding the
employer-employee relationship made in Copen and Davis. The Davis
court stated that its finding for the claimant was partly the result of
liberally construing the statute in favor of eligibility. 7 It is not clear
why the same liberal construction was not applied in Copen. For ex-
ample, one of the purposes of the Act is to stimulate "stability of
employment."88 It hardly stimulates stability of employment to award
UCB in Davis because the employment relationship had been severed
and not to award UCB in Copen because the employment relationship
was still intact8 9 Nor is it clear why the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review's application of Copen was wrong. The key to
Copen was the common membership of claimants and strikers in the
UMWA 0 This common membership, the court concluded, means that
the claimants were financing, participating in, or directly interested in
the strike.91 The Davis claimants were also members of the striking
UMWA. Presumably, they should have been disqualified under Copen.
An important reason for the different outcomes is that the Copen court
found that the burden of proof to show they were not participating in
the dispute was on the claimants.' However, the court stated that this
rule putting the burden of proof on the claimants does not apply when
86. Id. at 415.
87. Id at 406, syl. pt. 6.
88." W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(4) (1989).
89. Davis, 84 S.E.2d at 415 (distinguishing Copen because the claimants in Copen
were still employed at the time of the strike).
90. Copen, 43 S.E.2d at 386.
91. Id.
92. Davis, 84 S.E.2d at 414.
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claimants had no employment relationship with the struck employer at
the time the strike began.93 The court cited no authority for this prop-
osition. Furthermore, the court's extensive discussion of the importance
of the employment relationship simply does not justify such different
treatment of the two groups of claimants.
As mentioned before, the LDD is vaguely worded; its ambiguities
lead to inconsistent results. Without an articulable rationale to reconcile
the purposes of the Act with the LDD, inconsistency is nearly inevita-
ble. There are inherent conflicts between the Act's stated purposes and
the LDD. It is one of the main purposes of my proposal in part IV to
resolve these conflicts.
C. Lockouts, Voluntariness, and the Purposes of UCB
Cumberland & Allegheny Gas Co. v. Hatcher94 is significant as
an illustration of the problems inherent in the LDD. In Cumberland
the court found that "a lockout is but a counterpart of a strike" and
held that a stoppage of work caused by a lockout disqualifies the
locked out employees. 95 This holding was overruled in Lee-Norse Co.
v. Rutledge.9 However, Cumberland is still worth looking at as an
illustration of the LDD's propensity to cause injustice. That the court
could conclude that a lockout and a strike are the same for purposes
of the LDD, even though it is well-accepted that the Act should be
given a liberal construction, serves to warn us that the LDD's vague-
ness is susceptible to many inconsistent, socially harmful decisions.
Fortunately for the claimants in Cumberland, the court found that
no work stoppage had occurred.97 The employer argued that the lock-
out prevented much of its routine work from being done.9" The court
93. id
94. 130 S.E.2d 115 (W. Va. 1963).
95. Id at 120.
96. 291 S.E.2d 477, 480 (W. Va. 1982).
97. Cumberland, 130 S.E.2d at 123.
98. Id. at 121 (the employer noted that during the dispute no work was performed on
meters, no handling was made of routine service orders, no domestic meter reading was
performed, no work constructing new lines or repairing old ones was done, no meter tests
were conducted, no routine maintenance at customers' homes was performed, and no engi-
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noted, however, that production levels were not affected. There was
"no substantial showing of unfilled demands or unfilled require-
ments ... and no showing of an accumulated backlog of work or
services.., sufficient to require overtime employment."' The court
stated that a work stoppage cannot be found "solely on the basis of
the proportionate number of employees affected."1°° Instead, there
must be a showing of reduced production."°' Unfortunately, the court
offered little guidance on how to determine the amount of production
diminution needed to have a work stoppage. The court said that this
determination will depend on the facts of each case. °2 However, the
court did not suggest even general guidelines for interpreting the facts
of each case. After discussing other cases that had addressed the issue,
the court concluded only that a stoppage of work means "a substantial
curtailment of the normal operations of the employer."'0 3 This circu-
lar definition is no help at all.
Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge °4 is notable for attempting to recon-
cile the LDD and the Act's purposes. 0 5 As mentioned above, Lee-
Norse also overruled Cumberland's holding that a lockout can result in
disqualification.'°6 Lee-Norse also addressed the concept of
"voluntariness," but without much success. Finally, Lee-Norse overruled
the holding in Miners in General Group v. Hix0 7 that a work stop-
page caused by a labor dispute exists even when the parties are still
negotiating a new contract.'0 8 The Lee-Norse court based its finding
that the claimants were eligible for UCB on the main purpose of the
Act, which is not to regulate the employer-employee relationship but
neering or design work was done).
99. Id
100. Id.
101. Id
102. Id.
'103. Id. at 123.
104. 291 S.E.2d 477 (W. Va. 1982).
105. Id at 481.
106. Id. at 480.
107. 17 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1941).
108. Lee-Norse, 291 S.E.2d at 481 ("We find that when a contract has expired, and
there has been no new agreement, there is not created thereby a disqualifying 'dispute' per
Code 21A-6-3(4).").
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which rather is to provide means "for the promotion of social and
economic security by reducing as far as practicable the hazards of
unemployment. " '°9 The court stressed the remedial nature of the Act
and the requirement of liberal construction."1 One wonders, however,
what policy justifies denying UCB to strikers legally involved in a
work stoppage if the Act is not intended to regulate the employment
relationship but exists to alleviate the hazards of unemployment."'
Clearly, excluding strikers from receiving UCB has the effect of regu-
lating part of the employment relationship, namely the part involving
disputes over wages, benefits, and conditions of employment.
The Lee-Norse decision is based on the voluntariness argu-
ment.112 This is the argument that the Act's benefits should not be
available to the voluntarily unemployed. 3 The court acknowledged
that some strikes are forced by the employer's unreasonable behavior
and are involuntary.1 4 The court concluded that the purposes of the
Act are served when a claimant receives UCB because she or he is
forced to strike. 5
Despite Lee-Norse's more liberal attitude toward the LDD, the
opinion fails to explain why any person involved in legal collective
activity should be disqualified. Strikers are always at least partly invol-
untarily unemployed because of the other employees' refusal to agree
to terms. Furthermore, even if one accepts the argument that strikers
are voluntarily unemployed, it does not follow that they should be
denied UCB. The same purposes that justify paying UCB to locked-out
employees and to strikers not involved in a work stoppage seem to
apply with equal force to strikers involved in a work stoppage.16
109. Id. (quoting Homer Laughlin China Co. v. Hix, 37 S.E.2d 649, 655-56 (W. Va.
1946)).
110. ICE
ill. IM
112. IM. at 482.
113. I& ("Workers who ... make a conscientious choice that the loss of wages during
a strike is worth any potential benefits they hope to gain" have made a voluntary choice).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1 (1989).
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Strikers' families also need security from unemployment." 7 Paying
UCB to strikers would guard against the menace of unemployment to
health, morals, and welfare.118 Providing UCB to strikers also helps
to maintain society's purchasing power119 and stimulates stability of
employment.12 Additionally, paying UCB to strikers eliminates the
negative consequences of having families reduced to depending on
welfare to survive. 21
The most likely reason for the LDD appears to be to punish strik-
ers for deciding to exercise their right to strike. That exceptions are
made when an employer offers terms of employment that are substan-
tially inferior to employment conditions for similar work in the locality
does not support the position that voluntariness alone is the LDD's
rationale.122 After all, those who refuse such substantially inferior
terms of employment make a voluntary decision not to work just like
other strikers. Also, claimants are not disqualified for voluntarily refus-
ing to accept a job that is vacant because of a labor dispute.12 3 From
a practical perspective, it is difficult to see what the major distinction
is between striking and refusing to accept a job created by a strike.
Either case is one where the claimant is "voluntarily" unemployed.
D. Ash v. Rutledge and the Attempt to Narrow the LDD
Ash v. Rutledge'2 narrowed the scope of the LDD by giving a
restrictive interpretation to the provision that disqualifies one for par-
ticipating in, financing, or being directly interested in a labor dis-
pute.12 Ash involved a strike by a painters union at a plant owned
by Dupont.126 The claimants were members of the International
117. W. VA. CODE § 21A-l-1(1) (1989).
118. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(2) (1989).
119. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(3) (1989).
120. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(4) (1989).
121. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(5) (1989).
122. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
123. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-6 (1989).
124. 348 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1986).
125. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
126. Ash, 348 S.E.2d at 443.
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Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. They had no dispute with the em-
ployer.127 However, they did not cross the painters' picket line. The
court held that the claimants were not disqualified because they were
not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute.12
The Unemployment Compensation Board of Review affirmed, but the
Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed because the claimants'
unemployment was caused by their refusal to cross the picket line.129
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and award-
ed the claimants UCB. The court focused on the "directly interested
in" phrase.' 3° The court maintained that the word "directly" requires
more than "merely sympathy or an abstract attitude of mind."''
Among other things, the court noted that the claimants were powerless
to avert the event that precipitated the dispute, namely, the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement between Dupont and the
painters' union. The court also noted that the claimants did not join in
the picketing and indicated a willingness to work if the gate they nor-
mally entered had been open.'32
Although Ash can be justified by its consistency with the purposes
of the Act and the requirement of liberal construction, other problems
exist. For example, the court focused almost exclusively on the "direct-
ly interested in" phrase, giving little analysis of the "participating in"
or "financing" provisions. Also, the court did not reconcile its holding
with the provision in the LDD disqualifying claimants for being mem-
bers of the same "grade" or "class" of workers participating in the
dispute. 33 Participating in a dispute need not mean actually joining
the picketing. It can also mean participation by withdrawing one's
127. id
128. Id. at 444.
129. Id.
130. I& at 446.
131. Id
132. Id
133. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992). The "participation" requirement has
been criticized for the purposelessness of applying the LDD to workers' status only. See
Schoenfield, supra note 32, at 894 (the grade, class, and participation provisions of the
LDD are striking examples of vicarious guilt.)
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labor.134 Additionally, the painters and the electrical workers both be-
longed to the AFL-CIO. The electrical workers could be said to be
partly financing the dispute by contributing to the AFL-CIO's strike
fund.
The LDD requires claimants to prove two separate things: that one
is not participating in, financing, or directly interested in the dispute
and that one is not a member of the same grade or class of the em-
ployees involved in the labor dispute. 3 A claimant may not be di-
rectly interested in a dispute but still be disqualified for being of the
same grade or class as the strikers.131 If defined broadly, the phrase
"grade or class" could eliminate many employees who are not directly
interested in a labor dispute. However, even a narrow definition of
"grade" or "class" can yield unfair results. As one commentator noted,
"It seems both unfair and unwise to disqualify a claimant based on his
status rather than on his conduct." 13 7 It is hard to conceive of a situ-
ation when it would be consistent with the benign purposes of the Act
to disqualify a claimant solely because of her or his "grade" or
"class." Even if a valid policy underlies that LDD, it is hard to see
how any legitimate public policy could be served by imposing great
financial problems on a person who is guilty of no misconduct.
So despite Ash's liberal construction on the phrase "directly inter-
ested in," the court did not explain why the other disqualifying provi-
sions did not apply. As the dissent argued, why the claimants should
not have been disqualified simply for voluntarily refusing to work is
not clear.33 Lee-Norse, after all, maintained that the purpose of the
Act is to assist the involuntarily unemployed. 39 The claimants in
Ash could have entered by another gate.' 40 They chose not to cross
the picket line-an understandable decision, but still a voluntary
one.141 So, once again, it seems that voluntariness is not the rationale
134. Ash, 348 S.E.2d at 447 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).
135. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
136. For a discussion of the unfair results that can be caused by the terms "grade" and
"class," see Schoenfield, supra note 32, at 894-95.
137. lMA at 895.
138. Ash, 348 S.E.2d at 447.
139. Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477, 482 (W. Va. 1982).
140. Ash, 348 S.E.2d at 446.
141. Recently, three states have clarified their LDD provisions to provide that one who
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for the LDD. Indeed, if one can be disqualified because of one's
"grade" or "status," voluntariness cannot possibly be the rationale for
the LDD.
E. Roberts v. Gatson: An Unjustified Narrowing of Key Exceptions
To the LDD
In 1990 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided
Roberts v. Gatson,142 in which the court for the first time addressed
two of the exceptions to the LDD. These exceptions are that employ-
ees involved in a work stoppage can nevertheless receive UCB if they
are "required to accept wages, hours, or conditions of employment
substantially less favorable than those prevailing for similar work in
the same locality" or if they are denied the right to collective
bargaining. 
143
Roberts concerned a strike by the International Chemical Workers
Union against Pittsburgh Plate Glass, Inc., following the expiration of
the collective bargaining agreement. During negotiations the union
asked the employer to supply information related to a proposed in-
crease in employer-provided medical coverage.1" The employer
failed to supply the requested information, and the union filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB on the ground that the employer
failed to bargain in good faith.145
The union argued that it should be eligible for UCB because the
employer's last wage offer was substantially less than the wages pre-
vailing in the locality in similar businesses. 146 The court noted that it
refuses to cross a picket line may not receive UCB. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-109(2)
(1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(d) (Supp. 1992); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5221
b-3(d)(1) (West 1987).
142. 392 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1990).
143. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992).
144. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 211 (the employer offered to raise the cap on medical
insurance benefits from $200,000 to $225,000. The union requested information regarding
total medical costs which had been paid to employees and their dependents during the peri-
od of the old contract).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
146. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 212.
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had never addressed this issue before, but decided that a sensible
method to address the union's claim about wages was to compare the
employer's last offer with the wages existing in the locality. 147
First, however, the court addressed the issue of denial of right to
collective bargaining. The court stated that it would look to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act1  (NLRA) as a starting point.149 When
a party is accused of a refusal to bargain, the basic inquiry is whether
there is evidence of a lack of good faith.151 The relevant question in
Roberts was whether the employer's failure to turn over the requested
information regarding prior medical benefits paid constituted a refusal
to bargain in good faith."' The court pointed out that cases decided
under the NLRA have identified several factors that are relevant in
determining if a failure to turn over requested information evidences a
lack of good faith.1 52 Important factors are the relevance of the infor-
mation to a mandatory bargaining subject and whether there is a rea-
sonable basis for nondisclosure.
153
The court stated that the duty to exchange information does not
mean that every rejected request for information will constitute a deni-
al of the right of collective bargaining. 154 The court held that re-
quested information must relate to a mandatory bargaining subject 55
and must be so essential that the collective bargaining process would
be frustrated without it.156 Also relevant is whether the employer had
a bona fide reason not to disclose information. 57 The court admits
that the state law collective bargaining standard is a stricter test than
that used to determine an unfair labor practice under the NLRA.5
The court justifies the adoption of the stricter test by pointing out that
147. Id at 212-13.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 151-87 (1988).
149. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 208.
150. Id (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988)).
151. Id at 210.
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id at 211.
155. Id
156. Id
157. Id
158. Id
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the Act requires a complete denial of the right to collective bargaining
as opposed to the NLRA's provision that failure to bargain in good
faith over a mandatory subject is illegal. 59
The Roberts court applied this test to the facts and concluded that
the requested information was not so vital as to cause a complete
denial of the right to collective bargaining."W However, there is evi-
dence that the employer tried to deny the right of collective bargain-
ing. When the negotiations were beginning, the employer warned that
the negotiations were not going to be "business as usual.''161 Indeed,
the employer's initial offer contained forty-nine items, thirty-nine of
which were requested givebacks and two of which would have frozen
benefits.1 62 Evidence also indicated that the employer's final offer
was substantially less favorable than the terms of the existing con-
tract.163 Other actions indicate the employer's disregard for the bar-
gaining process. For example, the employer unilaterally instituted a
drug testing policy without first bargaining with the union. As a result,
the NLRB issued a complaint.1" Also, the past practice of the par-
ties was to allow the union to make the first contract proposal, but
this time the employer made its demands first with its proposed thirty-
nine givebacks.1 65 Finally, in past negotiations, the union had never
had any difficulty obtaining information needed for bargaining."
The claimants, therefore, argued that the totality of the circumstances
revealed the employer's lack of good faith.167 The claimants also
pointed out that an inference of illegal surface bargaining is stronger
when there are accompanying violations of the NLRA1 68
159. IdL Applying a stricter test than the NLRA requires clearly interferes with the
federal policy favoring collective bargaining. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International
Union, 361 U.S. 477, 483 (1960); Steve G. Eisenberg, Policy Considerations Underlying the
Payment of Unemployment Compensation to Strikers, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 30, 32 (1984) (LDD
likely violates Supremacy Clause of United States Constitution.)
160. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 211-12.
161. Appellants' Brief at 8, Roberts v. Gatson, 392 S.E.2d 204 (W. Va. 1990).
162. Id.
163. Id at 10.
164. Id at 9.
165. Id at 8.
166. Id. at 10.
167. Id at 19.
168. Id at 19-20 (quoting CHARLES MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 579
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Roberts failed to address the issue of surface bargaining and,
therefore, Roberts serves to encourage disregard of the NLRA. The
court emphasized that its holding rested on the Act's requirement that
collective bargaining be totally frustrated by an employer's behavior
and a mere lack of good faith is not sufficient to inyoke the exception
to the LDD.'" The court made it quite clear that the Act's use of
the phrase "denial of the right of collective bargaining" means a total
denial. 170
It .is not clear how egregious an employer's behavior must be to
frustrate totally the right of collective bargaining. Apparently, a great
deal of proof would be needed to show that negotiations were so deep-
ly flawed as to completely frustrate the right of collective bargaining.
Roberts makes it possible for employees who go out on strike because
an employer has failed to bargain in good faith over a mandatory topic
to be disqualified from receiving UCB because, the entire bargaining
process was not completely frustrated.
The court's failure to discuss voluntariness of unemployment in
Roberts, even though Lee-Norse stated that compensating the involun-
tarily unemployed is the purpose of the Act, is a glaring omission.1 71
A discussion of voluntariness would have been particularly appropriate
in Roberts because the exception to disqualification for being denied
the right to collective bargaining appears to have as its purpose the
protection of those who are involuntarily unemployed because of the
denial of collective bargaining. If the purpose of the Act really is to
aid the involuntarily unemployed, then a strike caused by an
employer's bad faith bargaining should not result in disqualification.
However, Roberts appears to permit sham bargaining so long as it is
not so extreme as to completely deny the right to collective bargain-
ing. That the employer might have committed an unfair labor practice
(1983)); see also THEOPHIL C. KAMHOLTZ & STANLEY R. STRAUSS, PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 68-69 (1987).
169. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 211. Employers already routinely violate the National Labor
Relations Act. See Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times For Unions: Challenging 77mes for Labor
Scholars, 58 U. CiM. L. REV. 1015-21 (1991).
170. Id
171. Lee-Norse v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d 477, 482 (W. Va. 1990).
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is not dispositive. The court does not explain how disqualifying per-
sons on strike because of an employer's bad faith bargaining furthers
any purpose of the Act.
The Roberts court did not discuss the well-established rule that the
Act is to be liberally construed. A liberal construction of the phrase
"denial of the right of collective bargaining" could not have resulted in
such a narrow interpretation of the exception to disqualification.
Clearly, a liberal construction would favor UCB eligibility.172 The
court did not have to construe the exception so narrowly. It could have
held that any time an employer's behavior is such that an unfair labor
practice for failure to bargain in good faith should issue, then the
exception applies. Nothing in the language of the Act forecloses such
a conclusion, and, indeed, as mentioned above, the purposes of the Act
would favor such an interpretation. However, the court clearly stated
that behavior which might result in a violation of the NLRA is not
sufficient in itself to invoke the exception to LDD disqualification. 173
The court noted that the NLRA and the Act use different phrases
regarding bargaining.174 However, the court fails to explain why the
somewhat different wording compels a narrow reading of the LDD
exception. The court should have construed the LDD exception to
"achieve the benign purposes of the Act to the full extent possible"
and ruled in favor of the claimants.
75
172. The court has often stated that "[u]nemployment statutes, being remedial in nature,
should be liberally construed to achieve the benign purposes intended to the full extent
possible." See, e.g., Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 215 (McHugh, J., dissenting, in part) (citing
Gordon v. Rutledge, 337 S.E.2d 920, 922 (1985); Pennington v. Cole, 336 S.E.2d 210, 212
(1985); Belt v. Cole, 305 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1983)); Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 291 S.E.2d
477, 482 (W. Va. 1982); Davis v. Hix, 84 S.E.2d 404, syl. pt. 6 (W. Va. 1954); Sole v.
Kindelberger, 114 S.E. 151, 153 (W. Va. 1922) ("Compensation Acts, being highly remedial
in character, though in derogation of the common law, should be liberally and broadly
construed to effect their beneficent purpose.").
173. IA at 211.
174. Id
175. Id. at 211.
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I. UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
A. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory: 176 States May
Disqualify The Involuntarily Unemployed Under the LDD
In 1976 the Supreme Court of the United States refused a consti-
tutional challenge to an Ohio statute which disqualified any person
from receiving UCB if her or his unemployment was due to a labor
dispute at any place of business owned by the claimant's employer,
even if such business was located in another state. 177 The claimant
was laid off by United States Steel Company because its coal supply
was low due to the strike. 178
The district court found the statute to be unconstitutional as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. 79 The court acknowledged that a
legislature may create classifications that discriminate against certain
persons if the classification furthers a legitimate government pur-
pose." However, the court stated that no legitimate purpose was
served by disqualifying individuals who have no control over the dis-
pute, are not at fault in some way, or stand to benefit from the dis-
pute.8 Furthermore, the court pointed out that the laid-off steel
workers were victims, not beneficiaries, of the strike.182
The Supreme Court reversed.18 3 The Court stated that the legisla-
tive history of the Social Security Act reveals that states are free to
disqualify from receiving UCB even those who are involuntarily unem-
ployed.' 4 The Court further stated that "innocence" is not a determi-
native factor and even employees who actively oppose the labor dis-
176. 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
177. IE at 472.
178. Id at 473.
179. Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 408 F. Supp. 1016, 1022 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 471 (1977).
180. IM. at 1021.
181. Id at 1022.
182. Id.
183. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 477, 493 (1977).
184. I1& at 482-84.
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pute may nevertheless be disqualified.1 15 The Court found that the
Ohio statute implicated no fundamental interest and the claimants were
not a part of a protected class.186 Therefore, the statute was evaluat-
ed under the lenient rational basis standard. s7
The claimant argued that the statute was overbroad because it
disqualifies individuals who are not only geographically remote from
the dispute but who have no direct interest in it at all.188 The Court
found this argument to be unpersuasive because it focuses solely "on
the harm done to the claimant without considering the employer's
interest or the state's interest in the fiscal integrity of the fund.189
The Court concluded that because Ohio's LDD statute prevents em-
ployers from having to pay higher UCB premiums because of a strike
and protects the UCB fund's fiscal integrity, the statute is rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose."9°
Hodory's holding is far reaching. It rejected the argument that
voluntariness of unemployment is the rationale for the LDD.'9' The
Court stated that even a worker who opposes the strike (but partici-
pates in it) can be disqualified. 2 The Court's extraordinary conclu-
sion was that a completely innocent claimant can be disqualified even
if the claimant has no interest at all in the strike which might be
occurring hundreds of miles away from where the claimant works.
Not only does Hodory amply illustrate the possibility of the
LDD's leading to injustice, the Court applied the rational basis test in
a way that totally ignores the remedial purposes of the Act. The Court
did not demonstrate how the LDD's broad scope is truly rationally
related to the goal of providing basic economic assistance to those
who are unemployed through no fault of their own. A provision that
not only does not further the Act's purposes but actually undermines
185. ML at 485-86.
186. Id. at 489.
187. Id
188. IM. at 490.
189. Id at 491.
190. Id at 492.
191. L at 489-90.
192. Ia
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them is not rationally related to the government's interests as articulat-
ed in the Act. Furthermore, the impact of paying UCB in a situation
like Hodory's would not be great since such occurrences are exception-
al. Likewise, the Court failed to demonstrate that the statute actually
saves Ohio a significant amount of money or is needed to protect the
fiscal integrity of its fund. A rational LDD would be a narrow one
that is consistent with the stated purposes of the Act.
B. New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of
Labor: States May Pay UCB To Those Voluntarily Unemployed
Due to a Labor Dispute
New York permits strikers to receive UCB after a seven-week
waiting period.' 93 In 1971, employees of Bell Telephone went on
strike. New York Telephone Company eventually paid out over $49
million in UCB.19 4 The employer sued to have the New York statute
declared to be preempted by the NLRA. The district court agreed with
the employer that New York's LDD violated the principle that states
should remain neutral in labor disputes.1 95 The court believed that
paying UCB to strikers is tantamount to forcing the employer to subsi-
dize a strike.'9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
versed."9 The appellate court pointed out that Congress has been
asked more than once to exclude strikers from receipt of UCB, but
Congress has refused to do so.198 Hence, there is no evidence that
Congress ever intended to preempt state laws like New York's. The
'court opined that providing UCB to strikers after a seven-week period
193. N.Y. Lab. Law § 592(1) (McKinney 1988).
194. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 523
(1979).
195. New 'York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810, 824
(S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir. 1977), aft'd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
196. Id
197. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 566 F.2d 388 (2d Cir.
1977), aft'd, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
198. Id at 392 (excluding strikers was proposed to Congress in 1935, 1947, and 1969.
Each time Congress refused to exclude strikers and left the matter to the states).
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"represents a good-faith effort to strike a balance between neutrali-
ty... and the social and economic well-being of its citizens."1"
The court recognized that neutrality does not consist of the state's
denial of UCB during the duration of a work stoppage but requires a
state to strike a balance that attempts to avoid unduly punishing one
party to a dispute. Clearly, to deny UCB to strikers involved in a legal
work stoppage when the employer is not denied any kind of state
benefits is not state neutrality.2°° New York's policy of distributing
the costs of a work stoppage more equally on both parties is much
closer to neutrality.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.2 1
The court stressed that the New York statute does not primarily in-
volve labor-management relations.2' The Court also stressed that
UCB are not a direct form of compensation from employer to employ-
ee but are public funds for public purposes.2 3 Therefore, the argu-
ment that paying UCB to strikers forces an employer to finance a
strike is not accurate. °4 The Court also rejected the employer's argu-
ment that voluntariness is the key to UCB eligibility.205 The court
explained that nothing supports the idea that Congress intended to
restrict UCB eligibility to only the involuntarily unemployed. °6 The
Court observed that in the case of a purely federal program-the Rail-
road Unemployment Insurance Act-Congress expressly allows strikers
to receive UCB. °7 Finally, the Court stated that the mere fact that
199. Id at 393 (discussing public policy expressed in N.Y. LAB. LAW § 501
(McKinney 1977)).
200. Schoenfleld, supra note 32, at 866-67 (denial of benefits to strikers is not a neu-
tral act because: (1) it places severe economic pressure on workers not to combine their
economic strength in unions, (2) states offer many types of financial aid to business which
are not affected by a business's involvement in labor disputes, and (3) in most cases, em-
ployers are in a much better position to endure a strike. Hence, the doctrine of state neu-
trality, rather than requiring disqualification of strikers, requires states to pay UCB to strik-
ers).
201. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. at 519.
202. Id at 534.
203. Id
204. Id at 534-35.
205. Id at 537 n.28.
206. Id
207. Id at 545 n.44 (discussing 45 U.S.C. § 354).
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receipt of UCB might alter the balance of power in a labor dispute is
not sufficient to assume that Congress intended to preclude strikers
from receiving UCB. °8
This important case disposes of some of the most common ratio-
nales for the LDD: that UCB are intended only for the involuntarily
unemployed, that payment of UCB to strikers forces employers to
finance strikes, and that altering the relative power of the parties to a
dispute is sufficient reason to preclude paying UCB to strikers. After
New York Telephone it is particularly difficult to determine what poli-
cies actually do justify the LDD.
C. Lyng v. UAW: Anti-Union Animus and the Constitutionality of
the LDD .
Lyng v. UAW 2°9 is relevant to this discussion even though it in-
volved food stamp eligibility for strikers, not UCB eligibility. Lyng
upheld a 1981 amendment to the Food Stamp Act210 that excludes
strikers from receiving food stamps.
For the purposes of this Article, the important part of Lyng is
Justice Marshall's dissent in which he states that the striker amend-
ment impeminissibly singles out strikers "for special punitive treat-
ment."211 Justice Marshall assessed the three proffered justifications
for the amendment, found them unconvincing, and concluded that the
amendment's real purpose is to harm a politically unpopular group.2 2
The government argued that food stamps are not intended for
those who voluntarily refuse to work. 213 Justice Marshall found this
208. Id. at 546.
209. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
210. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1988).
211. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 374-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For support of Justice
Marshall's position, see Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing, and the Constitution, 4 VAND L.
REV. 574, 575 (1951) (briefly tracing the history of Congressional and judicial hostility to
labor unions); see also JAMES ATLESON, VALums AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR
LAW (1983) (many references illustrating the history of congressional and judicial hostility
to the labor movement).
212. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 385.
213. Id. at 378.
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argument unpersuasive because of the great disparity between the way
strikers are treated and the way persons who voluntarily quit their jobs
are treated.21a Justice Marshall pointed out that voluntary quitters are
disqualified for only ninety days, while strikers are disqualified for the
duration of the strike.215 Also, voluntary quitters have an opportunity
to prove good cause existed and become immediately eligible.
216
Strikers are not afforded the opportunity to show good cause no matter
how unfair their employers' actions might have been.217
The government also argued that the amendment seeks to preserve
the financial integrity of the fund.218 Justice Marshall replied that this
argument can be used to justify the exclusion of any unpopular group
because the exclusion will always save money.219 Justice Marshall
quoted from another case that "a concern for the preservation of re-
sources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in
allocating the resources.,
2 20
Finally, the government argued that the LDD is necessary to en-
sure state neutrality during a labor dispute.221 Justice Marshall noted
that this argument was the only one relied upon by the majority to
support its position.222 However, the neutrality argument rests on an
inadequate understanding of the government's influence on a labor
dispute.223 Businesses receive many benefits from the government,
such as tax subsidies, government contracts, and government loans.
None of these depends on the businesses' abstaining from involvement
in a labor dispute.224 Justice Marshall concluded that if one views
the relationship between business and government in its totality, the
214. Id at 379.
215. Id
216. Id
217. Id
218. Id at 376.
219. Id
220. Id (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 207 (1982)).
221. Id at 380.
222. Id
223. Id at 382.
224. Id
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withdrawal of food stamp eligibility from strikers can hardly be
viewed as neutrality.
After rejecting the government's reasons for the striker amend-
ment, Justice Marshall opined that the real reason for the striker
amendment is antistriker animus.226  He concluded that the
amendment could not even survive the rational basis test because a
"bare Congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group can-
not constitute a legitimate governmental interest."2
27
Justice Marshall's dissent concerned only food stamps, not
UCB.22" Nonetheless, his discussion can be usefully applied to the
UCB context.229 The same rationales offered by the government to
explain the food stamp amendment are often used to justify the LDD.
Just as antistriker animus can be viewed as the reason for denying
food stamps to strikers, so can it also be viewed as the reason for
denying UCB. It is time for a reconsideration of the LDD to determine
if there is sufficient rationale for it.230 If a legitimate rationale does
exist, then efforts should be made to narrow the wide scope of the
LDD to minimize injustice and to further the stated remedial purposes
of the Act.
231
IV. A RADICAL PROPOSAL
A. The Inherent Contradictions of the LDD and the
New York Alternative
I propose that West Virginia adopt New York's LDD provision.
Three reasons support this proposal. One is that the stated purposes of
225. Id.
226. Id. at 383.
227. IaL at 385 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
Several commentators have argued that the rational basis review is so deferential as to be
tantamount to no review at all. See, e.g., Ann H. Denney, Comment, Rational Basis Review
Under the Equal Protection Clause-A Double Standard Review-City of Clebume, Texas v.
Clebume Living Center, 55 Miss. L.J. 329, 336 (1985).
- 228. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 381.
229. Schoenfield, supra note 32, at 903 (Justice Marshall's arguments apply equally
well to food stamps and UCB).
230. Id. at 905.
231. Id.
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West Virginia's Act and the LDD are inconsistent. Another is that the
LDD violates constitutional rights to association, free speech, and equal
protection. Finally, the LDD conflicts with federal labor law.
West Virginia's Act has as its goals providing security to families
of unemployed persons; guarding against the menace to health, morals,
and welfare caused by unemployment; stimulating as great a purchas-
ing power as possible; stimulating stability of employment; and allay-
ig and preventing the debilitating consequences of poor relief assis-
tance.2 32 The LDD undermines rather than furthers these goals. For
example, if protecting the welfare of families during periods of unem-
ployment is a legitimate goal, inflicting economic harm on the families
of strikers conflicts fundamentally with one of the Act's stated purpos-
es. The purpose is to protect families. Spouses and children have no
say whether a labor dispute will occur and how long it will last. Even
if one were persuaded that strikers were truly voluntarily unemployed
and that, therefore, denial of UCB is justified, there is still no reason
to punish the families of strikers who are involuntarily enmeshed in a
dispute in which they have no voice.
Another example of how the LDD conflicts with one of the Act's
stated purposes concerns the purpose of maintaining as great a pur-
chasing power as possible despite unemployment. 2 3 For instance, a
strike in a small West Virginia community can be much more devas-
tating financially to the community's economy than a similar strike
would be in a larger community. Providing UCB to strikers would
help to keep the local economy from collapsing during a prolonged
strike. As Justice Stephens pointed out in New York Telephone, UCB
Acts are concerned with the public welfare, not with regulating labor-
management relations.2" Because this is the case, strikers, in pro-
longed strikes at least, should receive UCB to promote the public
welfare by preventing economic collapse in affected communities.
Arguments to the contrary, such as the need to maintain state neutrali-
ty in a labor dispute, rely on the idea that the Act has as one of its
goals the regulation of labor-management relations. Because this idea
232. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1 (1989).
233. W. VA. CODE § 21A-1-1(4) (1989).
234. New York TeL Co., 440 U.S. at 534.
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has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court2 35 and because
the stated purposes of the Act are to promote the public good, the
state neutrality argument is not a valid reason for the LDD.
The inconsistencies caused by the LDD are compounded by the
confusion caused by attempts to narrow the LDD so that it will con-
flict less with the purposes of the Act. For example, Roberts concerned
the denial of collective bargaining exception to the LDD.236 The ex-
ception seeks to protect collective bargaining rights from being too
greatly damaged by the LDD's penalty on strikers. However, the LDD
severely damages the only weapon labor has for enforcing the right to
collective bargaining, the strike. The denial of collective bargaining ex-
ception is a weak attempt to repair the damage that the LDD does to
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the denial of collective bargaining
exception makes little sense when one considers that UCB is not de-
nied to one who refuses to accept a position created by a labor dis-
pute.2 37 Although strikers and those who refuse to take a position
created by a strike are not in identical positions, the difference be-
tween these two groups hardly seems great enough to justify denying
UCB to one group but not the other. Such inconsistencies are evidence
that the'LDD lacks a reasonable rationale and support the position that
the LDD's main purpose is to punish strikers for invoking their right
to strike.
Roberts, discussed in part II, is an example of how the LDD's
lack of a rationale leads to wasteful litigation and inconsistent
results.2 38 Roberts sets forth a standard for determining if a claimant
meets the exception of being denied the right to engage in collective
bargaining, a standard stricter than that for finding the existence of
unfair labor practices under the NLRA.239 Roberts requires more than
a lack of good faith bargaining. Instead, it requires a complete denial
of the right to bargain.2' So, a provision that is supposed to be an
235. Id.
236. Roberts v. Gatson, 392 S.E.2d 204, 207 (W. Va. 1990) (discussing W. VA. CODE
§ 21A-6-3(4) (Supp. 1992)).
237. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-6 (1989).
238. See discussion supra part II.
239. Roberts, 392 S.E.2d at 211.
240. Id.
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exception to the LDD is now a message to employers that they can
bargain in bad faith and incur no UCB liability as long as bad faith
does not rise to whatever level would be needed to find that a com-
plete denial of collective bargaining had occurred. In Roberts, the court
simply ignored its own principle of liberal construction of remedial
acts. Not only that, but the court construed the provision more narrow-
ly than required by the language of the exception. Interpreting the
exception as meaning that employers must have engaged in actions
that would constitute a breach of good faith bargaining under the
NLRA would not have conflicted with the exception's wording and
would have accorded with the principle of liberal construction.
Roberts' reading of the denial of collective bargaining exception also
conflicts with federal labor law.241 Roberts weakens the incentive to
bargain in good faith by adopting a test for UCB eligibility that is
much stricter than the NLRA's.242 Roberts allows bad faith bargain-
ing and other behavior that could amount to an unfair labor practice to
undermine the key provision of the NLRA, namely, the duty to meet
and confer over mandatory subjects of bargaining. Roberts not only
permits employers to ignore their good-faith obligations, it penalizes
employees who go out on strike in reaction to an employer's bad faith.
It is difficult to comprehend what public policy is advanced by punish-
ing the victims of bad-faith bargaining.
New York's law dealing with strikers and UCB eligibility is supe-
rior to those of other states. The New York LDD is a simple, fair one
that can make unnecessary much of the lengthy litigation involved by
having to examine closely the facts of a dispute and having to make
difficult decisions over issues such as strike/lockout, volun-
tary/involuntary, good-faith bargaining/bad-faith bargaining, and so
on."' West Virginia's Act also requires other difficult decisions,
such as whether a person is participating in, financing, or directly
interested in the labor dispute; whether a person is a member of the
grade or class of persons involved in the dispute; and whether a work
stoppage has occurred.24 By contrast, New York's LDD provision
241. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
242. Md
243. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 592(1) (McKinney 1988).
244. One commentator has pointed out that the typical LDD provision contains about
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nakes the intelligent assumption that after a strike has lasted for a
long period, in this case, more than seven weeks, both parties should
share the blame and the cost of the dispute.25 This realistic approach
attempts to deal evenhandedly with both parties (real neutrality), and it
does not require extensive intrusion into the bargaining process. Also,
the New York provision does not unfairly require one party to shoul-
der a disproportionate share of the costs of a dispute. Furthermore, it
does not require the employee to carry the burden of proving that she
or he falls into an exception. As Roberts revealed, proving that one
meets an exception to the LDD might be very difficult. New York's
LDD avoids, to a large extent, "the inherent conflict between the un-
derlying policy of employment security law.., and the policy under-
lying the labor dispute disqualification."246 Some writers have called
this conflict impossible to resolve "because the notion of unemploy-
ment compensation for involuntary unemployment apparently cannot be
accommodated under the express terms of the labor dispute disqualifi-
cation."2 7 However, New York's LDD provision does overcome this
conflict.
B. The Constitutionality of the LDD
Cases like Lyng and Hodory reveal that the Supreme Court does
not accord much weight to strikers' constitutional arguments. Hodory's
holding that the LDD affects no fundamental interest or protected class
ten major questions, each one of which can lead to extensive litigation: (1) What constitutes
a work stoppage? (2) What constitutes a labor dispute? (3) What causal relationship is re-
quired by the words "unemployment due to a labor dispute"? (4) What causal relationship is
required by the words "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute"? (5)
What constitutes a "factory, establishment, or other premises"? (6) What constitutes "partici-
pating in" a labor dispute? (7) What constitutes "financing" a labor dispute? (8) What con-
stitutes being "directly interested in a labor dispute"? (9) What constitutes membership in a
"grade" or "class" of workers, some of whom are participating in, financing, or directly
interested in a labor dispute? (10) What constitutes "separate branches of work which are
commonly conducted as separate businesses in separate premises"? Williams, supra note 33,
at 339.
245. Eisenberg, supra note 159, at 46.
246. Andrew L. Pepper, Abilla v. Agsalud, The Labor Dispute Disqualification in Ha-
waii, 10 HAW. L. REV. 449, 466 (1988).
247. Id
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and, therefore, laws that disqualify strikers from receiving governmen-
tal benefits should be judged by a rational basis review makes the
chance of prevailing on constitutional grounds seem dim.' Nonethe-
less, some persuasiveness remains in the argument that the LDD in-
fringes on rights of free speech and association. I believe these consti-
tutional arguments merit another look.
Some courts have been persuaded by constitutional attacks against
the LDD. For example, in a three to zero decision, a district court
found that Ohio's LDD disqualifying claimants who are unemployed
because of a labor dispute involving a union over which the claimants
had no control violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 9 The court found that
such a broad exclusion did not bear a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose because the claimants had no say at all over the
strike.' ° Therefore, the court observed, denying benefits to the
claimants in no way serves the state interest of not subsidizing a
strike2 1 Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court reversed
and asserted that the Ohio LDD was rationally related to the fiscal
integrity of the fund and the financial concerns of employers. 2 2
The district court in Lyng was persuaded that the food stamp
striker amendment was unconstitutional."3 The court found that the
denial of food stamps interferes with the right to associate with one's
family and with one's fellow union members. 4 The amendment al-
so, according to the court, interferes with the strikers' right "to express
248. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). For
arguments that the First Amendment should apply to labor picketing, see Cox, supra note
211, at 591-602.
249. Hodory v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 408 F. Supp. 1016, 1022 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), rev'd, 431 U.S. 471 (1977) (unemployed steel worker, a USWA member, dis-
qualified by Ohio LDD because his unemployment occurred as a result of a coal miners'
strike by the UMWA).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. 431 U.S. at 471-72.
253. UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 360
(1988).
254. IM. at 1239.
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themselves about union matters free from government coercion."' 5
Interestingly, the court also suggested that strikers should be consid-
ered a protected class because historically they have been discriminated
against as an unpopular group." 6 As mentioned above, Justice Mar-
shall believed that the striker amendment to the Food Stamp Act was
a violation of equal protection
2F7
Perhaps the major obstacle to constitutional arguments against the
LDD is the longstanding doctrine that a decision by the government
not to subsidize a right is not an infringement of the right.28 This is
not the place for a lengthy discussion of constitutional law. It should
be noted, however, that this doctrine has been vigorously attacked. For
example, James Atleson has written persuasively about the negative
effects on free speech resulting from the massive concentration of
wealth in the hands of a relatively few large businesses.29 This con-
centration of capital results in the inability of many viewpoints to find
adequate means of dissemination. 6° Voices, such as those of labor
unions, are drowned out by the mainstream media which is greatly
influenced by massed capital.261 If such drowning out of alternative
views is to be avoided, then the doctrine that the state has no duty to
expehd public funds to facilitate the right to free speech must be mod-
ified. To think that denying UCB to strikers does not seriously im-
pinge on First Amendment rights strains credulity.262 In many cases
economically weak groups, such as labor unions, do need governmental
assistance to have their message heard, especially in an environment
where massed capital can afford to saturate the public with its mes-
sage.
255. 1L
256. Id. at 1240. Justice Marshall later suggested that stricter scrutinizing should apply
to legislation impinging on strikers' rights. See 485 U.S. at 375 n.1.
257. See supra notes 207-29.
258. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 368.
259. James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power, and Society, 44 MD. L. REV. 841
(1985); see also Lesser, supra note 21, at 171-76.
260. Atleson, supra note 259, at 856.
261. Id. at 857.
262. Id at 870 (Atleson-writes that the power of unions has always been exaggerated
with the result that the law is interpreted as if no imbalance of power exists between labor
and capital).
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Charles Reich has written eloquently about the need to protect
individuals from the massive power of modem corporations.263 Reich
argues that our Constitution is unbalanced because our courts interpret
the law in ways that privilege organized power.26' Reich believes
that we need a new constitutional theory that approaches rights not
merely as the right to be left alone by the state but as sources of
empowerment.265 Reich argues that current constitutional doctrine un-
dervalues individual rights as it overvalues state interests.2" In this
era, the powerful administrative state has such influence over our lives
that constitutional rights must be affirmatively supported lest they be
forever lost.267
Considering Reich's views in connection with the constitutionality
of the LDD, one can see that the doctrine that the state has no obliga-
tion to affirmatively aid the enjoyment of constitutional rights fails to
address modem reality. Cases discussing the LDD are remarkable in
their privileging of the state's interest, for example, the interest in
neutrality during a labor dispute, over the interests of strikers to asso-
ciate with each other and to engage in free speech. Our country is a
system of huge organizations which monopolize "the ways of making a
living and the ways of fdfilling our needs." 268 In such a system the
lone individual is powerless. Empowering individuals so that they can
exercise their individual rights must be a concern of the government if
such rights are to be meaningful. 269 Denying benefits to strikers who
are engaged in legal activity is a serious impingement of the right to
associate with others and to engage in free speech.
C. The LDD and Federal Policy Favoring Collective Bargaining
The third reason that New York's LDD provision is superior is
that it is more consistent with the longstanding federal policy in favor
263. Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE LJ. 1409, 1410 (1990).
264. Ia at 1411-12.
265. Ia at 1416.
266. Ia at 1430.
267. L at 1430-32.
268. Ia at 1435.
269. l at 1441.
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of collective bargaining. Not only does the denial of UCB impinge on
the constitutional rights of strikers, it damages the equality of econom-
ic power that is the basis of collective bargaining. Many years ago the
Supreme Court noted that the presence of effective economic weapons
is a "necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties."'27 The
Court observed that the presence of effective economic weapons serves
the purpose of encouraging negotiation.271
A union's basic economic weapon is the strike. If government
policies, such as the LDD, make the strike so impractical that it is no
longer an effective weapon, then collective bargaining itself becomes
damaged beyond repair. Many scholars believe that the strike already
is an ineffective weapon.272
The inequality between employers and employees is great. Strike
funds are seldom adequate to support long strikes.273 Individual
workers seldom have the personal resources to last in a prolonged
strike. This is especially true in the 1990s because real wages have
been falling since the 1970s.274 As one court put it, strikers might be
able to pay their debts for one month with savings, but a lack of
income for more than two months would create devastating
270. NLRB v. Insurance Agent's Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
271. Id at 496.
272. See CHARLEs C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM 30-31 (1988); Matthew Finkin,
Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic Strike 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547 (1990);
Roger Keeran & Greg Tarpinian, Public Policy and the Recent Decline of Strikes, 18 POL'Y
STUD. J. 461 (1989-90); Gary Minda, Rediscovering Progressive Labor Politics: The Labor
Law Implications of Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,
16 VT. L. REv. 71 (1991); Timothy P. O'Reilly, Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the
NLRA: Devaluation of the Strike, 6 LAB. LAW. 133 (1991).
273. HECKSCHER, supra note 272, at 30. As one court noted, the combination of low
strike benefits, ineligibility for UCB, and the fact that most people have only modest sav-
ings compel one to conclude that paying UCB is conducive to achieving state neutrality.
Doing so would help equalize the bargaining positions of the parties. Grinnell Corp. v.
Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 858, 879 (1973). Achieving greater
equality of bargaining power is one of the NLRA's stated purposes. 29 U.S.C. § .151
(1988).
274. JOHN J. SWEENEY & KAREN NUSSBAUM, SOLUTIoNs FOR THE NEW WORK FORCE:
PoLIcEEs FOR A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 13 (1989).
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hardships.275 Unions themselves are suffering from declining member-
ship and, hence, from dwindling resources to sustain a strike. 6
The courts have also done much to harm the union movement.
The first major decision to limit the Wagner Act's efficacy held that
employers have a right to hire permanent replacements during a
strike.2' Other decisions vastly curtailed the number of topics which
are mandatory bargaining topics.28 Also, unions may not fine mem-
bers who desert the strike and return to work.279 Recently, the NLRB
ruled that unions may not require persons who quit the strike to reim-
burse the union for strike benefits paid to them.280 In an action
brought under the Railway Labor Act,281 the Supreme Court recently
handed down a decision that allows employers to retain employees
who deserted a strike even if doing so means denying reinstatement to
employees with more seniority once the strike has ended.282
In addition to the harm caused by the courts, many employers
during the 1980s proved to be willing to commit thousands of unfair
labor practices to destroy unions. For example, charges of discriminato-
ry discharge for union-related activities soared to approximately 16,000
per year in the early 1980s.283 This willingness to illegally discharge
employees for union activities creates a climate of fear. One survey
found that seventy percent of nonunion workers believe that many
employers would discharge or otherwise mistreat employees for engag-
ing in union activities.2
275. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 460 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S.
858, 879 (1973). For an interesting discussion of the financial hardships often endured by
strikers, see T. THOMAS GEOGHAN, WHICH SIDE ARE You ON? 233-50 (1991).
276. Keeran & Tarpinian, supra note 272, at 463.
277. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (overturning NLRB
decision that employer had committed an unfair labor practice by not rehiring five strikers).
278. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (subjects which
comprise the core of entrepreneurial control are not mandatory bargaining subjects).
279. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
280. Canterbury Coal Co., 305 NLRB 56 (1991).
281. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151-188 (1988).
282. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426
(1989).
283. Weiler, supra note 169, at 1020.
284. Id. at 1027.
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In this legal climate, unions can seldom manage a credible strike
threat.2"5 Although some might applaud the decline of the strike, one
must remember that the entire collective bargaining process depends on
a union's ability to wage a successful strike.286 If collective bargain-
ing is to survive, legal reforms to strengthen labor's position must be
made. One of these reforms should be to pay UCB to those engaged
in a legal strike.
New York's LDD provision is more consistent with the federal
policy favoring collective bargaining than other states' provisions
are." 7 New York's LDD provides for more equal treatment of strik-
ers and employers by refusing to fix fault on one of the parties to a
dispute. '8 Therefore, New York's Act achieves a greater degree of
neutrality by trying to avoid favoring either party to a dispute. 28 9
New York's LDD also comports better with labor law's premise
that both parties to a labor dispute must have effective economic
weapons to encourage good-faith bargaining. New York's LDD pro-
vides economic incentives to both parties to resolve their dispute.
Strikers must undergo the hardship of a seven-week period of disquali-
fication before becoming eligible for UCB. Even after the seven
weeks, strikers will still have an incentive to bargain because UCB
only provides partial wage replacement. 9' Furthermore, all acts pro-
vide that benefits cease after a specified period.2 9' Knowing that
UCB will cease in a relatively short period of time provides an incen-
tive to resolve the dispute before UCB terminates. On the other side,
employers have an incentive to avert strikes of longer than seven
weeks so they can escape liability for UCB payments. Hence, New
285. John G. Kilgour, Can Unions Strike Any More? 41 LAB. L.J. 259 (1990).
286. Id.
287. Robert Stem et al., Government Transfer Payments and Strike Activity: Reforming
Public Policy, 41 LAB. LJ. 505, 510 (1990). (New York's LDD is the most desirable in
light of public policy.)
288. Eisenberg, supra note 159, at 50.
289. Id
290. In West Virginia, UCB may not exceed 662h% of the state's average weekly
wage. W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-10 (1989).
291. In West Virginia, UCB ceases after twenty-six weeks. Id
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York's LDD achieves the neutrality that other states' LDDs do not
because state power is distributed equally among the parties.
D. Possible Objections to Adopting New York's LDD Statute
It is important to note that New York's LDD has not resulted in a
greater frequency of strikes. New York's Act is also much easier to
administer because courts and administrative agencies do not have to
make very difficult determinations such as whether a dispute is a strike
or a lockout, whether a person is voluntarily unemployed, whether a
person is participating in, financing, or directly interested in a strike,
and many others.
Of the possible objections that could be raised against West
Virginia's adopting New York's LDD, the two strongest probably are
that an employer should not have to subsidize a strike and that the
LDD is needed to preserve the fund's fiscal integrity. Regarding the
first objection, one should recall Justice Stewart's words in New York
Telephone that UCB are not a form of direct compensation from the
employer to the striker.2' UCB come from a public fund to effect a
public purpose. Payment is not made by the employer to discharge any
liability but to carry out a policy of social betterment.293 Secondly,
the New York LDD recognizes that a strike that lasts for a relatively
long period cannot be assumed to be solely the employees' fault.
294
Hence, the employer's alleged "financing" of the dispute results at
least in part from its own intransigence as much as the employees'.
West Virginia's LDD unjustly imputes fault to strikers despite judicial
statements about neutrality. If one accepts the proposition that strikers
are voluntarily unemployed, no reason exists to reject the converse: By
refusing to reach an agreement, employers themselves voluntarily pro-
long the dispute and, therefore, voluntarily "choose" to pay UCB. New
York's LDD avoids useless inquiries into fault by presuming that after
seven weeks, both parties share the fault. Furthermore, the public poli-
292. Stern et al., supra note 287, at 509.
293. IA at 510.
294. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 534
(1979).
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cy purposes of UCB outweigh an employer's financial interests. UCB
attempt to preserve the welfare of families, maintain levels of purchas-
ing power as far as possible to protect the community, protect the
health and welfare of the public, and promote employment stability.
There are yet other responses to the first objection. Most strikes
do not last eight weeks or more. Hence, paying UCB to strikers under
New York's LDD would be a rare event. As mentioned above, empiri-
cal evidence indicates that New York's LDD does not increase the
length of strikes.295 So, if West Virginia were to adopt New York's
LDD, the increase in payments of UCB to strikers would not be great.
Also, making employers liable for UCB after the seventh week of the
strike should reduce the incidence of strikes. "Joint Cost Theory" pro-
vides that as the costs of strikes rise, the more likely it is that parties
will develop improved bargaining procedures to avoid strikes.2 6 In
this way, requiring payment of UCB to strikers encourages employers
to settle quickly, thus promoting the main goal of labor policy-
industrial peace. Finally, all Acts have built-in limits on liability. Bene-
fits are only a fraction of real wages, and UCB terminate after a short
time (twenty-six weeks in West Virginia).297
The second objection concerns the fiscal integrity of the unem-
ployment funds. Some of the above arguments also apply to this ob-
jection. Strikes do not usually last eight weeks or more. The important
public policies of the Act should be effectuated when at all possible
due to the individual and communal harms caused by unemployment.
New York's LDD provision promotes industrial peace and might well
lower the incidence of strikes. The state has a great interest in main-
taining levels of purchasing power and in maintaining employment
stability.
A further response to the second objection is that collective bar-
gaining is the key to federal labor policy and effective economic
weapons are essential.29 Unions are presently in the weakest position.
295. Eisenberg, supra note 159, at 46.
296. Shadhur, supra note 34, at 298.
297. Stem et al., supra note 287, at 509.
298. Id. at 508.
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that they have been in since before the Wagner Act. Unions are so
vulnerable that a failed strike is devastating. The strikers put every-
thing on the line, and the risk of failure is great. Indeed, commentators
have said that the strike weapon has become so weak that it has be-
come employers' most effective weapon.2" Employers often deliber-
ately provoke strikes so that they may destroy unions." If the strike
is to remain labor's only true weapon, then there must be legal re-
forms to make this weapon effective again. I argue that one of these
reforms should be adoption of LDDs identical to New York's to help
put the disputants on more even ground. Otherwise, collective bargain-
ing will speed onward to its demise and the dream of workplace de-
mocracy will vanish into history.
V. CONCLUSION-
THE PRESENT SYSTEM DOES NOT MAKE SENSE
In this Article I have argued that West Virginia's LDD lacks an
underlying rationale to justify it. Attempting to make some sense of an
Act that undermines its own beneficent goals by singling out strikers
for special treatment, West Virginia's courts repeatedly reach decisions
which are inconsistent and which conflict with federal labor policy.
Worse, they reach decisions that, result in considerable injustice."'
Recent cases like Roberts continue to yield unjustifiable results and lay
the foundation for future injustice. The LDD requires courts to make
very difficult decisions regarding the merits of the parties' positions.
The LDD implies by its existence that striking itself is a form of fault.
The LDD's existence cannot otherwise be explained adequately. Imput-
ing fault to strikers is an intrusion of state courts into federal labor
policy. 30
2
New York's LDD offers a fairer alternative. It does not impute
fault to one party only. It is consistent with the Act's goals of alleviat-
ing hardship resulting from unemployment. At the same time, New
299. HECKSCHER, supra note 272, at 30.
300. Id
301. Id at 61.
302. Id at 62.
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York's LDD evenhandedly distributes the costs of engaging in a pro-
longed dispute and, therefore, encourages settlement and industrial
peace.
I agree with the writers who concluded that the present "system
does not make sense." 3 A system that imposes great hardships on
the families of persons involved in labor disputes conflicts with the
reasons for the Act's existence. As one article on the LDD puts it, "It
is time for reform."
303. Steam et al., supra note 287, at 511.
304. Il
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